Seminario
The Role of Unreliability in the Negative Experimentalist Critique
Abstract dell'evento
"Negative" experimental philosophers have offered extensive evidence that philosophical judgments vary across different demographic groups and across different contexts of judgment. These experimentalists argue, on the basis of this evidence, that our philosophical judgments are epistemically problematic – and that our current philosophical methods must therefore be revised. Typically, the 'problematic' property in question is held to be unreliability; the standard argument, then, is grounded in the claim that experimental studies indicate that our philosophical judgments are unreliable. Unfortunately, there has to date been very little exploration of the precise notion of reliability being appealed to in the negative experimentalist argument. In this talk I examine a recent exchange between Edouard Machery, Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg which hinges on modal features of the notion of reliability. Though this exchange represents the most in-depth discussion of the experimentalist's notion of reliability to date, I argue that neither side identifies an interpretation of reliability that could plausibly ground the negative experimentalist critique. I then suggest that this lacuna supports Alexander and Weinberg's contention that the experimentalist critique should be reformulated using alternate epistemological concepts.
Relatori/Relatrici
Jennifer Nado (University of Hong Kong)
Dettagli sull'evento
Data e luogo
Inizio: 26/03/2025
alle ore 11:00
Fine: 26/03/2025
alle ore 13:00
Palazzo Albani (Urbino, Via Viti, 10) Aula C5 - Sala Lauree
Organizzato e promosso da:
Dipartimento di Scienze Pure e Applicate
Scuola di Scienze, Tecnologie e Filosofia dell'Informazione
Modalità di partecipazione
Altre informazioni utili
Ingresso libero. Per informazioni: pierluigi.graziani@uniurb.it
