Seminario
Belief-less reasoning and coordination
Abstract dell'evento
Coordination in simultaneous games with multiple equilibria is one of the long-standing puzzles of game theory. When there is a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium – as in Hi-lo – the puzzle becomes a scandal. The received view among game theorists, enshrined in so-called level-k theories, is that coordination is facilitated by people’s cognitive limitations when they engage in meta-representation (the representation of others’ beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, etc.). In my talk I will explore a different idea: a large amount of evidence collected by cognitive scientists suggests that people rarely reason about others’ beliefs, and that when they do, it is usually for justificatory purposes. Most real-word planning and coordination is smoothly achieved without reasoning about beliefs. I will review the empirical evidence, and argue that it invites to explain coordination in terms ‘Belief-less Reasoning’. I will argue that Belief-less Reasoning is a form of instrumental reasoning, that it solves Hi-lo problems intuitively, and that it encompasses Team Reasoning. Time permitting, I will talk about the challenge of testing the Belief-less Reasoning hypothesis experimentally against theories of limited meta-representation.
Programma
Seminario appartenente al ciclo dei Synergia Seminars.
Relatori/Relatrici
Francesco Guala (University of Milano)
Dettagli sull'evento
Data e luogo
Inizio: 16/04/2025
alle ore 11:00
Fine: 16/04/2025
alle ore 13:00
Area Scientifico Didattica Paolo Volponi (Urbino, Via Saffi, 15) Aula C2
Organizzato e promosso da:
Dipartimento di Scienze Pure e Applicate
Scuola di Scienze, Tecnologie e Filosofia dell'Informazione
Modalità di partecipazione
Altre informazioni utili
Seminario aperto a tutti gli interessati. Per informazioni: pierluigi.graziani@uniurb.it
