Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo / Portale Web di Ateneo


Seminario Lectiones Commandinianae

Logics for Strategic Reasoning  of Socially Interacting Rational Agents

Programma

Reasoning about socially interacting rational agents is about strategic abilities of individuals (agents) and groups (coalitions) of individuals to guarantee the achievement of their desired objectives, while acting and interacting within an entire society of agents. Several logical systems have been proposed for formalising and capturing such reasoning, starting with the Coalition Logic (CL), the Alternating Time Temporal Logic (ATL) and some extensions of these, introduced the early 2000s. 

Coalition Logic provides a natural, but rather restricted perspective: the agents in the proponent coalition are viewed as acting in full cooperation with each other but in complete opposition to all agents outside of the coalition, which are thus treated as adversaries. The Alternating Time Temporal Logic extends Coalition Logic with temporal operators allowing for expressing long-term temporised goals. 

The strategic interaction in real life is much more complex, usually involving various patterns combining cooperation and competition. To capture these, more expressive and versatile logical frameworks are needed. 

In this talk I will first present briefly Coalition Logic and then will introduce and discuss some more expressive and versatile logical systems, including:   

i. the Socially Friendly Coalition Logic (SFCL), enabling formal reasoning about strategic abilities of individuals and groups to ensure achievement of their private goals while allowing for cooperation with the entire society;   

ii. the Logic of Coalitional Goal Assignments  (LCGA), capturing reasoning about strategic abilities of the entire society to cooperate in order to ensure achievement of the societal goals, while simultaneously protecting the abilities of individuals and groups within the society to achieve their  
individual and group goals. 

iii. the Logic for Conditional Strategic Reasoning ConStR, formalising reasoning about agents’ strategic abilities conditional on the actions that they expect the other agents to take. 

 In conclusion, I will take a more general perspective on a unifying logic-based framework for strategic reasoning in social context. 
 


Relatori/Relatrici

Valentin Goranko (Stockholm University) 


Dettagli sull'evento

Data e luogo

  Inizio: 31/05/2023 alle ore 11:00 Fine: 31/05/2023 alle ore 13:00
Collegio Raffaello (Urbino, Piazza della Repubblica, 13) Aula Turing

 In presenza e Online

Organizzato e promosso da:

Dipartimento di Scienze Pure e Applicate
Scuola di Scienze, Tecnologie e Filosofia dell'Informazione
LM-78 - Classe delle lauree magistrali in scienze filosofiche - Filosofia dell'informazione. Teoria e gestione della conoscenza
Synergia Research Group


Modalità di partecipazione

Altre informazioni utili

Per ulteriori informazioni, contattare: pierluigi.graziani@uniurb.it


Link e risorse utili

Segui il seminario su Zoom  aggiungi al calendario

Posta elettronica certificata

amministrazione@uniurb.legalmail.it

Social

Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo
Via Aurelio Saffi, 2 – 61029 Urbino PU – IT
Partita IVA 00448830414 – Codice Fiscale 82002850418
2024 © Tutti i diritti sono riservati

Top